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Introduction
An extensive economic literature has develop ed concerning the effects of imperfect information and risk aversion on the behavior of economic agents.
The results which emerge from many of these models differ from those derived using the perfectl y com petitive assumptions. This divergence casts doubt on the relevance of static certainty models as a basis for the formation of public policy in a dynamic uncertain world. Public utility reg ulation and vertical integration are two areas which have been noticeably affected by the developments in the economics of uncertainty.
Recent papers by Meyer (9) , Peles and Stein (11) , and Perrakis (12) , concerning the effects of uncertainty on the behavior of reg ulated monopolists raise fundamental questions about the relevance of the Averch-Johnson (2) over capitalization effect, the foundation of the theory of rate of return reg ulation for almost twenty years. The existence of the A-J effect depends on the precise manner in which un certainty enters into the firm's decision environment. In some cases, it is actually reversed (11) .
Even if the effect is operational in the usual direction, its magnitude may be reduced for a firm that is risk averse (9).
These results should indicate to public utility com missioners that uncertainty and a firm's attitude toward risk cannot be ignored in the design of a regulatory constraint.
Uncertainty or lack of perfect information is often dis cussed as one of the causes for market failure: that is, a break down of the competitive system. It is conceivable that a firm may respond to uncertainty by attempting to gain more control over its decision environment. One way to accomplish this goal is to substitute internal organization for participation in a market process. Vertical integration is one such structural response. It has long been acknowledged (8) that the incentive to integrate vertically is absent in the static certainty setting of the competitive model. However, rigorous analysis of the claim that uncertainty provides the incentive for the firm to integrate vertically has not been attempted to any significant degree. Arrow (1) and Green (4) are the well known exceptions.
A more recent attempt to model vertical integration under uncertainty by Carlton (3) considers both input and output firm s facing demand uncertainty; vertical integration upstream occurs in order to obtain an assured supply of an input. On the other hand, it is not possible to conclude that the oil industry is free of competitive problems; this model is merely an illustration of the need for policymakers to exer cise caution when using static certainty economic models as the basis for condemning some forms of economic organization. How ever, the static uncertainty model presented in this paper may not be descriptive of the decision environment in which a pipe line firm operates. Additional research is clearly necessary regarding the applicability of the model to the pipeline industry.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections.
The model is formulated for both quantity setting and price set ting monopolists (Sections I I and I I I) , and then the resulting welfare implications and comparisons to the other models are presented (Section IV) .
I I.
Structure of the Problem
The model in this paper is similar to that constructed by M eyer (9) that is, the dispersion (riskiness) of total revenue increases as total expected revenue increases for changes in price or output.
Given the random demand, the general form of the monopolist's decision problem is: The above discussion is an overview of the model. The next section contains a rigorous exposition of the model for both quantity setting and price setting firms.
I I I. M odel
In order to focus on the output decision in the regulated stage, it is necessary to make some simplifying assumptions about the environment in which the firm operates:
1) Consider a quantity setting firm that is vertically integrated through two stages of a production process.
2) The output of the initial stage Q requires two inputscapital K and labor L; that is, Q=Q(K,L) with aQ, aQ > 0 and 3) The firm is a monopolist in the market for Q and thus subject to a rate of return constraint. A unit of Q is either sold or used by the firm to produce W.
The price of Q depends on aL post the total amount produced; that is, the firm faces a random inverse demand schedule t(Q ,v ) such that at < 0 and at > o. v is ao av a random element with finite moments. The corresponding revenue function is concave. The rate-of-return constraint applies to the revenue generated by the total amount of Q produced. The regulatory commission determines ex ante an allowed rate of return s applicable to the total amount of K used by the firm.
The expected profit from the regulated stage operation must be 3 less than or equal to (s-r) K.
4)
The price of W is determined in an imperfectly competi tive market; that is, p = p(W, u) such that < 0 and 1£ > 0. aw au M is a random element with finite moments. The corresponding revenue function is concave. Q and K which maximize the expected utility of profit Eu ( ) sub ject to the rate of return constraint that the expected profit from the entire amount of Q produced is less than or equal to 6 (s-r)K.
8)
The Principle of Increasing Uncertainty is satisfied;
that is, the riskiness of total revenue increases as expected total revenue increases for chan ges in price or output.
Formally, the problem for the firm is
subject to W, Q, K > 0 and E (t (Q ,v)Q-rK-wL (K,Q)) (s-r)K.
If = t (Q,v)Q-rK-wL (K,Q), then the Lagrangian function
where A is the Lagrange multiplier.
The necessary and sufficient 7 conditions for a maximum are: Equations (6) and ( 7 ) summarize the difference between the risk averse firm involved only in production of Q and the risk averse firm producing both Q and W. The firms react differently
even though both prefer reasonable and secure policies (risk aversion).
Intuitively, the nonintegrated firm is primarily concerned with avoiding losses if demand is less than expected, but the vertically integrated firm is concerned that demand for Q will be higher than expected so that an insufficient amount of Q will be available for its own downstream operation. In addition, to the extent that there is substitutability between Q and M in
the production of W and supply of M is uncertain, the risk averse firm may choose an input mix that favors the input it produces, thus accentuatin g the tendency to produce more output in the regulated stage than the nonintegrated firm. Concern over unexpected demand and an assured source of supply of an input, form the underlying rationale for the verticall y integrated firm's production decision in the regulated stage.
If a price setting firm is considered, then t, p, and K are determined ex ante. This means (i) Q = Q(t,v) with aQ < 0 and -at aQ > o, (ii) w = W(p, ) with a w < o and aw
is the labor requirement function for Q production,
and (iv) M =M(W(p, ), Q(t,v)) is the M requirement function for
W production.
The analog to equation (1) for the risk averse price setting firm is:
where y is the Lagrange multiplier. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are:
where all variables and partial derivations are evaluated at the equilibrium (t*, p*, K*, y *} 0 and -20 -
